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energy detection is an engaging method due to its simplicity and efficiency. However, the major 
disadvantage of energy detection is the hidden node problem, in which the sensing node cannot 
distinguish between an idle and a deeply faded or shadowed band. Cooperative spectrum sensing 
(CSS) which uses a distributed detection model has been considered to overcome that problem. On 
other dimension of this cooperative spectrum sensing, this is vulnerable to sensing data falsification 
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Spectrum Sensing and Security Challenges and 
Solutions: Contemporary Affirmation of the 
Recent Literature 
N. Shribala α, Dr. Srihari σ & Dr. B C Jinaga ρ
Abstract- Cognitive radio (CR) has been recently proposed as 
a promising technology to improve spectrum utilization by 
enabling secondary access to unused licensed bands. A 
prerequisite to this secondary access is having no interference 
to the primary system. This requirement makes spectrum 
sensing a key function in cognitive radio systems. Among 
common spectrum sensing techniques, energy detection is an 
engaging method due to its simplicity and efficiency. However, 
the major disadvantage of energy detection is the hidden node 
problem, in which the sensing node cannot distinguish 
between an idle and a deeply faded or shadowed band. 
Cooperative spectrum sensing (CSS) which uses a distributed 
detection model has been considered to overcome that 
problem. On other dimension of this cooperative spectrum 
sensing, this is vulnerable to sensing data falsification attacks 
due to the distributed nature of cooperative spectrum sensing. 
As the goal of a sensing data falsification attack is to cause an 
incorrect decision on the presence/absence of a PU signal, 
malicious or compromised SUs may intentionally distort the 
measured RSSs and share them with other SUs. Then, the 
effect of erroneous sensing results propagates to the entire 
CRN. This type of attacks can be easily launched since the 
openness of programmable software defined radio (SDR) 
devices makes it easy for (malicious or compromised) SUs to 
access low layer protocol stacks, such as PHY and MAC. 
However, detecting such attacks is challenging due to the lack 
of coordination between PUs and SUs, and unpredictability in 
wireless channel signal propagation, thus calling for efficient 
mechanisms to protect CRNs. Here in this paper we attempt to 
perform contemporary affirmation of the recent literature of 
benchmarking strategies that enable the trusted and secure 
cooperative spectrum sensing among Cognitive Radios. 
Keywords: cognitive radio network, secure spectrum 
sensing, mobility and trust, cognitive radio, symmetric 
cryptographic key generation, LT code. 
I. Introduction 
ireless technology is increasing swiftly, and the 
view of pervading wireless computing and 
communications offers the potential of many 
interpersonal and solitary pros. While individual gadgets 
in particular mobile phones, smart phones and 
notebook computers be given a lot of consideration, the 
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effect of wireless engineering is much more 
comprehensive, e.g., implies sensor networks for 
protection applications and home automation, smart 
grid control, body sensor devices and embedded 
wireless devices, and entertainment systems. This 
increase of wireless solutions brings about an ever-
increasing demand for more radio spectrum. 
Conversely, most quickly accessible spectrum bands 
being given, despite the fact that various investigations 
have actually indicated that these bands are 
substantially underneath in utilization. These factors to 
consider have encouraged the radio technologies that 
can level to reach foreseeable future requirements 
equally in terms of spectrum effectiveness and 
application functionality.  
Cognitive radios come with the promise of 
being a troublesome engineering advancement that will 
make it possible for the future telecommunication world. 
Cognitive radios are thoroughly automated cordless 
devices that can perceive their settings and dynamically 
adjust their transmitting waveform, channel access 
method, spectrum use, and networking protocols as 
needed for good networking and device performance. 
We foresee that cognitive radio engineering will 
eventually come up from initial phase research studies 
and to become a general-purpose automated radio that 
will suffice as a widespread platform for wireless system 
advancement, far similar to microprocessors, which 
have served a similar role for computation. There is 
conversely a big gap among having an adaptable 
cognitive radio, reliable building block, and the extensive 
deployment of cognitive radio networks that dynamically 
maximize spectrum usage.  
II. Contemporary Affirmation of the 
Literature of Secure Spectrum 
Sensing in Cognitive Radio Networks 
Published in Past Decade 
a) Reputation Aware Collaborative Spectrum Sensing 
The performance gains, achieved by 
collaborative spectrum sensing in CRN are well 
established in literature. The centralized collaborative 
spectrum sensing has been included in the IEEE 802.22 
standard draft [1]. The authors in [2], study impact of 
mobility on collaborative spectrum sensing. The authors 
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show that because of mobility, the secondary user 
sensing results get uncorrelated faster thus giving better 
performance compared to spectrum sensing performed 
by static secondary users but does not consider the 
presence of malicious users. To identify the malicious 
users in the CRN, the evaluation of trust for each 
secondary user under collaborative spectrum sensing 
has been addressed using different techniques in the 
literature. In the solution proposed by authors in [5], 
secondary users in close proximity are grouped into 
clusters and the system detects abnormal reports using 
shadow-fading correlation filters. The authors in [4] 
evaluate the secondary users trust, comparing deviation 
suffered by each secondary user’s sensing 
measurement from the average measurement reported 
at the fusion center. The Bayesian rule is applied in [6] 
to compute the a posteriori probability of being an 
attacker for each secondary user. When the posteriori 
probability of a certain secondary user exceeds the 
suspicious level threshold, it is claimed to be an attacker 
and is removed from the collaboration. For multiple 
attackers, the large number of combinations of attackers 
and honest users is removed by using an onion-peeling 
based approximation to reduce computational 
complexity. Abnormality detection algorithm based on 
proximity, which is widely used in the field of data mining 
has been introduced in [3], to solve the problem of 
malicious users in the system using history reports of 
each secondary user. The proposed architecture in[7], 
needs to collect spectrum sensing data from multiple 
sources or equipment on consumer premises. This 
process is known as crowd sourcing. The authors 
consider the area of interest is divided in cells and the 
credibility of these devices are kept in check by 
corroboration and merging among neighboring cells. 
The corroboration in a hierarchical structure is used to 
identify cells with significant number of malicious nodes. 
To the best of our knowledge, none of the existing work 
studied malicious and primary user detection for mobile 
CRNs. Our proposed solutions are different from all the 
existing solutions that we separate the location reliability 
from the user trust, thus achieve better performance on 
malicious user detection. 
The rapid growth in wireless communications 
has contributed to a huge demand on the deployment 
of new wireless services in both the licensed and 
unlicensed frequency spectrum. However, recent 
studies show that the fixed spectrum assignment policy 
enforced today results in poor spectrum utilization. To 
address this problem, cognitive radio (CR) [8,9] has 
emerged as a promising technology to enable the 
access of the intermittent periods of unoccupied 
frequency bands, called white space or spectrum holes, 
and thereby increase the spectral efficiency. The 
fundamental task of each CR user in CR networks, in the 
most primitive sense, is to detect the licensed users, 
also known as primary users (PUs), if they are present 
and identify the available spectrum if they are absent. 
This is usually achieved by sensing the RF environment, 
a process called spectrum sensing [8–11]. The 
objectives of spectrum sensing are twofold: first, CR 
users should not cause harmful interference to PUs by 
either switching to an available band or limiting its 
interference with PUs at an acceptable level and, 
second, CR users should efficiently identify and exploit 
the spectrum holes for required throughput and quality-
of service (QoS). Thus, the detection performance in 
spectrum sensing is crucial to the performance of both 
primary and CR networks. The detection performance 
can be primarily determined on the basis of two metrics: 
probability of false alarm, which denotes the probability 
of a CR user declaring that a PU is present when the 
spectrum is actually free, and probability of detection, 
which denotes the probability of a CR user declaring 
that a PU is present when the spectrum is indeed 
occupied by the PU.  
The idea of using Beta Reputation System as 
reputation evaluation system has been proposed in [12] 
in which a node’s confidence in its spectrum sensing 
report is used as a weight during calculation of 
spectrum decisions. This work assumes that the PU’s 
transmission range is large enough to be received by all 
nodes in the CRN including the SU base station (SUBS), 
the controlling entity of the CRN. It also assumes that 
the PU can communicate with SUBS, wherein a PU may 
complain to the SUBS regarding any interference 
caused by CRN operation. Since this work assumes that 
the PU cannot sell its unused spectrum bands, therefore 
there is no incentive for it to communicate with the CRN. 
This communication may cost a PU, additional hardware 
and/or system complexity, just to inform the CRN 
regarding interference caused to its communications. 
Furthermore, 
 
Figure 1 : Ad hoc CRN with malicious nodes Spectrum 
sensing reports only in PU’s coverage area should be 
considered for spectrum decisions, and only those SUs’ 
reputation scores will be updated 
The FCC requires that the CRN may use vacant 
spectrum bands in a non-interfering basis without the 
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need for any changes to the incumbent PU. This work 
also does not deal with any mobility by SUs or PUs. 
A collaborative spectrum sensing scheme is 
presented in [13] which introduces Location Reliability 
and Malicious intent as trust parameters. The authors 
employ the Dempster-Shafer theory of evidence to 
evaluate trustworthiness of reporting secondary user 
nodes. The proposed scheme assigns trust values to 
different cells in the network which may receive 
abnormal levels of PU’s signal due to the effects of 
multi-path, signal fading and other factors in the radio 
environment. Equal emphasis is given to the spectrum 
sensing reports from SUs using Equal Gain Combining 
while using trust values of the cells from where these 
reports were received as weights for data aggregation. 
This approach also assumes that the PU’s 
communication range is large enough to be received by 
the entire CRN and uses the spectrum sensing reports 
of all CRN nodes to reach the final spectrum decision. 
Authors in [4] and [14] assume that the 
transmission range of PU is large enough to be received 
in the entire CRN. [4] Proposes pre-filtering to remove 
extreme spectrum sensing reports and a simple average 
combining scheme to calculate spectrum sensing 
decisions while considering all reports that pass the pre-
filtering phase. [14]Characterizes the spectrum sensing 
problem as an M-ary hypotheses testing problem and 
considers a cluster-based CRN where cluster heads 
receive and process raw spectrum sensing data before 
forwarding to the fusion center. Since PU’s transmission 
range is assumed to be large enough to be received by 
every node in the network, both approaches cannot be 
adopted for a CRN in which a PU has smaller 
transmission range than the size of CRN. 
Muhammad Faisal Amjadet al [81] proposed a 
novel reputation aware collaborative spectrum sensing 
framework based on spatio-spectral anomaly detection. 
Their proposed system is well suited for situations where 
the PU’s communication range is limited within a sub-
region of the CRN. 
Simulations of their system shown that it is 
robust against SSDF attacks and can detect malicious 
behavior up to 99.3 percent of the time when malicious 
node density is within a reasonable range and is still 
very effective when the number malicious nodes is even 
greater. Their proposed system is also flexible enough 
to be used where PU’s communication range spans the 
entire CRN.  
b)
 
Secure Cooperative Spectrum Sensing in Cognitive 
Radio Networks
 
CR related research has received great 
attention recently. Because its dynamic spectrum 
access is fundamentally different from conventional 
wireless systems, there is a need to design different 
components in the protocol stack. The physical layer 
requires most fundamental change. A major research 
problem is how to correctly detect the existence of 
primary users and spectrum opportunities. In [15], 
Challapaliet. al proposes to use Hough Transform and 
autocorrelation function to detect spectrum 
opportunities. A more direct approach was presented in 
[16] to observe primary user’s signal-to-noise ratio 
(SNR) and entropy for seeking spectrum opportunities. 
A spectrum opportunity is recognized only when a 
spectrum has both low SNR and low entropy. According 
to [15], these schemes belong to collocated sensing 
architectures, since a single secondary user device 
carries on the spectrum sensing task and makes an 
independent decision to access a spectrum. However, 
due to the hidden-terminal problem, such a scheme 
may show poor performance in terms of miss detection 
and false alarm probabilities. To address this problem, 
techniques for cooperative spectrum sensing was 
investigated. In the authors utilize the fact that noise is 
independent at different users while signals are 
correlated, so adding up the received signals at two 
secondary users can increase SNR and improve 
detection accuracy. A similar approach is used in to 
increase detection sensitivity. The authors of [20, 22] 
employ sensors for distributed spectrum sensing. In 
[20], some sensors are placed close to primary 
receivers to detect their local oscillator leakage power, 
and then these sensors relay the detection information 
to secondary users. In [15], an independent sensor 
network is proposed to be deployed specially for 
spectrum sensing. All secondary users query the sensor 
network to learn the information about spectrum 
opportunities. In the link layer, CR related research 
mainly investigates new media access control (MAC) 
protocols to adapt to the dynamic change of spectrum 
opportunities. These protocols are more or less derived 
from conventional wireless MAC protocols. For example, 
DC-MAC [21] is a slotted MAC protocol similar to 
ALOHA but with an enhanced mechanism to optimize 
per-slot throughput; DOSS protocol was derived from 
MAC protocols based on busy tone; and CR MAC 
protocol [17] generalizes 802.11 into supporting multiple 
channels. There is less research on the network layer or 
layers above since the lower layers are still not well-
defined for CR networks. However, there has been 
research that takes cross-layer approaches to optimize 
network or above layer objectives by defining MAC or 
physical layer behaviors [19, 21]. Although security is an 
important aspect of spectrum sensing, to the best of our 
knowledge, there is virtually no previous work that 
addresses this issue. In the authors discuss the impact 
of malicious users on the required sensing sensitivity of 
individual terminals when cooperative spectrum sensing 
is performed. However, methods to ensure the 
robustness of spectrum sensing were not discussed. 
There has been a growing interest in attack-
resilient collaborative spectrum sensing in CRNs. Liu et 
al. [22] exploited the problem of detecting unauthorized 
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usage of a primary licensed spectrum. In this work, the 
path-loss effect is studied to detect anomalous 
spectrum usage, and a machine-learning technique is 
proposed to solve the general case. Chen et al. [23] 
focused on a passive approach with robust signal 
processing, and investigated robustness of various 
data-fusion techniques against sensing-targeted 
attacks. Kaligineedi et al.[4] presented outlier detection 
schemes to identify abnormal sensing reports. Min et al. 
[24]proposed a mechanisms for detecting and filtering 
out abnormal sensing reports by exploiting shadow-
fading correlation in received primary signal strengths 
among nearby SUs. Fatemiehetal. [7]used outlier 
measurements inside each SU cell and collaboration 
among neighboring cells to identify cells with a 
significant number of malicious nodes. Li et al. in 
[24]detected possible abnormalities according to SU 
sensing report histories. Our work is different from 
existing approaches in three aspects. First, we consider 
cooperation among attackers, so the attacks are much 
more challenging to prevent. Second, unlike the 
previous work which focused on sensing data 
falsification attacks, we also consider the case where 
the attackers violate the fusion center’s decision 
regarding spectrum access. Finally, our proposed 
attack-prevention mechanisms can easily prevent 
attacks without differentiating attackers from honest 
SUs. 
The problem of ensuring robustness in 
distributed sensing has been studied in [23], [4], and 
[27]. Chen et al. [23] proposed a robust data-fusion 
scheme that dynamically adjusts the reputation of 
sensors based on the majority rule. Similarly, in the IEEE 
802.22 standard draft, a voting rule[27] has been 
proposed for secure decision fusion. Kaligineedi et al. 
[4] presented a profiteering scheme based on a simple 
outlier method that filters out extremely low or high 
sensor reports. However, their method may not suitable 
fora very low SNR environment such as 802.22 WRANs 
wherea final data-fusion decision is very sensitive to 
small deviations in RSSs. The defense against Primary 
User Emulation Attack (PUEA) has also been studied in 
[25]and[26]. Chen et al. [25] proposed an RSS-based 
location verification scheme to detect a fake primary 
transmitter. This scheme, however, requires the 
deployment of a dense sensor network for estimating 
the location of a signal source, and thus, incurs high 
system overhead. Anand et al.[26] analyzed the 
feasibility of PUEA and presented a lower-bound on the 
probability of a successful PUEA. However, they did not 
address the impact of PUEA on the performance of 
cooperative sensing. The problem of enforcing/enticing 
secondary users to observe spectrum etiquette has also 
been studied. Woyachet al. [28] studied how to entice 
secondary users to observe spectrum etiquette by 
giving them incentives. In a similar context, Liu et al. [22] 
studied the problem of detecting unauthorized use of a 
licensed spectrum. They exploited the path-loss effect 
as a main criterion for detecting anomalous spectrum 
usage and presented a machine-learning approach for 
more general cases. In contrast, we focus on intelligent 
filtering of suspicious sensor reports. In a broader 
context, our paper is related to work on secure data 
aggregation [29], [30], [31] and insider attack 
detection[32] in wireless sensor networks. However, the 
problem we consider differs in that it focuses on an 
important, realistic case where attackers manipulate 
sensor reports to mislead the fusion center in making a 
final decision on detection of a primary signal. 
In order to entice SUs to follow the protocol, i.e., 
reporting the sensing results honestly, researchers used 
game-theoretic approaches to analyze SUs’ behavior. 
Duan et al. [34] proposed attack prevention 
mechanisms with direct and indirect punishments. 
Assuming that SUs care for their rewards, their scheme 
prevents SUs from reporting falsified sensing data by 
setting appropriate reward and punishment functions. 
Woyach et al. [28] developed a model for the incentives 
associated with attacks and for the tradeoffs between 
the different elements of an enforcement structure. 
To detect discrepancies among sensing data 
and ensure robust decisions in cooperative spectrum 
sensing, researchers have studied robust data-fusion in 
CRNs. Kaligineedi et al. [4] introduced a trust factor 
which gives a measure of reliability of each SU. By 
applying an outlier detection method, their data-fusion 
scheme assigns a lower trust factor to a SU whose 
sensing report is extremely high or low, reducing its 
effect on the sensing decision. Chen et al. [23] 
presented a weighted sequential probability ratio test 
which introduces a reputation-based mechanism to the 
sequential probability ratio test (SPRT). By increasing 
the reputation of a SU whose sensing report is 
consistent with the majority at each step, their scheme 
dynamically adjusts the weight of each SU so that a SU 
with higher reputation can have more influence on the 
sensing decision. Min et al. [33] proposed a correlation 
filter for the detection of abnormal sensing reports by 
exploiting the shadow fading correlation in RSSs. 
Assuming that RSSs at nearby SUs are correlated, they 
proposed a clustering method and data-fusion rules 
based on the correlation analysis of sensing reports. 
These defense schemes, however, have their 
own limitations in that their assumptions may not hold. 
Game-theoretic attack prevention assumes that SUs try 
to maximize their utilities by following the protocol. 
However, considering that attackers outside of a 
network can compromise  inside of the network. These 
schemes may not work well if these attackers do not 
care about compromised SUs’ utilities. Robust data- 
fusion schemes compare sensing data among SUs 
assuming that the numbers of honest SUs are much 
larger than that of malicious/compromised SUs which 
mount sensing data falsification attacks. Obviously, 
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robust fusion schemes may not be suitable for detecting 
attacks when the number of honest SUs becomes small. 
Noting that this number can easily be reversed in a 
network of a small number of SUs, CRNs are required to 
be capable of detecting attacks even when the number 
of honest SUs is small.  
Cooperative spectrum sensing has received 
considerable attention as a viable means to enhance the 
detection performance by exploiting spatial diversity in 
received signal strengths. However, this is vulnerable to 
sensing data falsification attacks due to the distributed 
nature of cooperative spectrum sensing. To overcome 
this problem, we introduce a primary user emulation test 
(PUET), under which a trustful central entity (e.g., a 
cellular base station) transmits a test signal while other 
users are sensing the spectrum. The core of PUET is to 
correlate the reported sensing data with the 
transmission power of the test signal. Since this test 
signal is, in reality, interference to the sensing of a 
primary signal, sensors cannot distinguish the test 
signal from the primary signal. Considering this 
characteristic of sensors, PUET detects attacks by 
evaluating the consistency of channel parameters, 
which are not known to sensors. By recognizing this 
defense mechanism, PUET checks the validity of reports 
from each sensor separately. The efficacy of PUET is 
validated via experimentation on a test bed deployed in 
an indoor environment. Our measurement study shows 
that PUET achieves over 95% detection rate while 
keeping the false alarm rate under 5%. 
Seunghyun Choi et al [82] proposed the design 
of reliable distributed sensing for opportunistic spectrum 
use is a major research challenge in DSA networks. To 
meet this challenge, they proposed PUET that detects 
the falsification of sensing results. The key idea behind 
PUET is that CPEs can acquire only RSSs, not the 
information of the signal source. To realize this idea, the 
BS transmits a test signal when CPEs sense the 
channel. Since CPEs cannot distinguish a test signal 
from a PU signal, the BS can detect sensing data 
falsification attacks by checking if the reported sensing 
data reflects the test signals it transmitted. In order to 
check the validity of sensing reports, the BS tests three 
consecutive sensing reports in a testing window. By 
checking the consistency of estimation of the received 
primary signal strength, the BS determines if there exist 
nonzero attack strengths in the sensing reports. They 
have evaluated the performance of attack detection with 
an indoor USRP2- based test bed. By conducting 
experiments on the test bed, we have confirmed that 
PUET detects attacks with both random and ON/OFF 
attack strengths. They have also found that PUET 
correctly detects PU signals even when more than a half 
of reports are faulty. 
 
 
   
noise channel was first addressed by Urkowitz [37]. In 
his proposal, the receiver consisted of an energy 
detector which measures the energy in the received 
waveform over an observation time window. This 
energy-detection problem has been revisited recently by 
Kostylev in [36] for signals operating over a variety of 
fading channels. Our contribution in this letter is twofold. 
First, we present an alternative analytical approach to 
the one presented in[36] and obtain closed-form 
expressions for the probability of detection over 
Rayleigh and Nakagami fading channels. Second, and 
more importantly, we quantify the improvement in 
detection capability (specially for relatively low-power 
applications) when low-complexity diversity schemes 
such as square-law combining (SLC) and square-law 
selection (SLS)are implemented. While diversity analysis 
is carried out for independent Rayleigh channels for the 
SLS scheme, both independent and correlated cases 
are considered for the SL Cone. For more details, the 
reader is referred to [35]. 
The underutilization of the radio spectrum as 
revealed by extensive measurements of actual spectrum 
usage [38] has stimulated exciting activities in the 
engineering, economics, and regulation communities in 
searching for better spectrum management policies. 
The diversity of the envisioned spectrum reform ideas is 
manifested in the number of technical terms coined so 
far: dynamic spectrum access’s. Dynamic spectrum 
allocation, spectrum property rights vs. spectrum 
commons, opportunistic spectrum access vs. spectrum 
pooling, spectrum underlay vs. spectrum overlay. Often, 
the broad term “cognitive radio” is used as a synonym 
for dynamic spectrum access. As an initial attempt at 
unifying the terminology and documenting recent 
developments, we provide a taxonomy of dynamic 
spectrum access and an overview of the technical 
challenges and advances in this emerging research 
area. 
Radio spectrum is a valuable commodity, and a 
unique natural resource shared by various types of 
wireless services. Unlike other natural resources, it can 
be repeatedly re-used, provided certain technical 
conditions are met. In practice radio spectrum can 
accommodate a limited number of simultaneous users. 
Therefore, radio spectrum requires careful planning and 
management to maximise its value for all users. 
Currently, spectrum regulatory framework is based on 
static spectrum allocation and assignment policy. Radio 
spectrum is globally allocated to the radio services on 
the primary or secondary basis. This is reflected in the 
Radio Regulations published by the International 
Telecommunication Union (ITU) [39], which contains 
definitions of these services and a table defining their 
allocations for each of three ITU geographic world 
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c) Securing Cognitive Radio Channels by LT Code
The PROBLEM of detecting an unknown 
deterministic signal over a flat band limited Gaussian 
regions. On the European level, radio spectrum is 
governed in the European Union by the Radio Spectrum 
Policy Group (RSPG) and Radio Spectrum Committee 
(RSC) and by European Conference of Postal and 
Telecommunications Administrations (CEPT). 
Additionally, national regulatory agencies define national 
allocation table and assign radio spectrum to licence 
holders on a long term for large geographical regions on 
exclusive basis. Generally, user can use radio spectrum 
only after obtaining individual license issued by national 
regulatory agency. In technical point of view, this 
approach helps in system design since it is easier to 
make a system that operates in a dedicated band than a 
system that can use many different bands over a large 
frequency range. In addition, spectrum licensing offers 
an effective way to guarantee adequate quality of 
service and to prevent interference, but it unfortunately 
leads to highly inefficient use of radio spectrum 
resource. Analyzing Article 5 of Radio Regulations [39], 
and national allocation tables it can be concluded that 
usage of radio spectrum bands is already determined. 
Furthermore, in national spectrum assignment 
databases almost all frequency bands of commercial or 
public interest are already licensed. Current predictions 
of further growth of demand for wireless communication 
services show substantial increase in demand of radio 
spectrum. All of this circumstances support raising 
serious concerns about future radio spectrum 
shortages. Nevertheless, related radio spectrum 
observation surveys have proved that most of the 
allocated spectrum is underutilized [40-46]. FCC's 
measurements in Atlanta, New Orleans, and San Diego 
in 2002 revealed that there are large variations in the 
intensity of spectrum use below 1 GHz [40, 41]. By 
observing two non-adjacent 7 MHz spectrum bands with 
a sliding 30 second window, the measurements showed 
that a fraction of 55-95 % of the observed frequencies 
were idle during the observation period on one band 
while on the other band the frequencies were almost 
fully idle. Shared Spectrum Company conducted 
spectrum occupancy measurements on the bands 
between 30 MHz and 3 GHz at six locations in the USA 
[42]. The average occupancy over the locations was 
found to be only 5.2 % with the maximum occupancy 
13.1 % in New York City and minimum occupancy 1 % in 
a rural area. Similar spectrum measurements conducted 
in Europe [43-46] (Germany, Spain, Netherlands, 
Ireland, France, Czech Republic) shows higher 
spectrum occupancy comparing to USA, but still rather 
low (e.g. 32% for the band 20-3000 MHz in Aachen area, 
Germany). Generally it can be concluded that spectrum 
occupancy is moderate below 1 GHz and very low 
above 1 GHz. 
Radio spectrum is as carcere source. The 
regulatory body Federal Communication Commission 
(FCC) is responsible for radio spectrum resources and 
regulation of radio emissions. The FCC assigns 
spectrum to licensed holders, primary users(PU)on a 
long term basis for large geographic alregio 
However, FCC found that most radio frequency 
spectrum was underutilized or in efficiently utilized. 
Therefore, now they have proposed then otion of 
secondary utilization where the users who have no 
spectrum licenses, these condary users (SU)are allowed 
touse temporarily unused licensed spectrum. Cognitive 
radio technology has brought are volutionary change in 
communication par adig man disreceivinga growing 
attention in recenty ears[47]. This technology can 
provide faster and more reliable wireless services by 
utilizing the existing spectrum band more efficiently and 
without interference to primary users. The cognitive radio 
network users need to be aware of dynamic 
environment and  adaptively adjust their transmission or 
reception parameters based on interactions with the 
environment and other users in the network to execute 
its task efficiently without interfering with licensed users 
or other cognitive radios. Since, cognitive radio is a 
secondary user; it has to vacate the band immediately 
as soon as there is arrival of primary user. Therefore, it is 
indeed very important for cognitive radio that 
transmissions hould be achieved with less bandwidth 
requirement and that correct data decoding should be 
possible at receiver side without the need of ACK 
(acknowledge) signal and Automatic Repeat Request 
(ARQ). To overcome this problem, a new class of 
erasure correcting codes known as fountain codes (also 
known as rate less erasure codes) is introduced and is 
under consideration to be used for transmission over 
cognitive radio network. The fountain code acts as a 
channel code to combat the effects of loss against PU 
interference and other channel conditions and helps 
receiver to decode complete data accurately. The 
fountain code produce limit less number of encoded 
symbols from given set of source symbols such that 
original source symbols can be recovered from any 
subset of encoded symbols of size equal toors lightly  
larger than number of source symbols. There are two 
classes off ounta in codes: Lu by Trans form(LT) codes 
and Raptor codes. Although Raptor codes are the most 
efficient codes, a new class of fountain codes, Raptor Q 
code sh as been introduced recently which seems to be 
more promising than its previous version Raptor code 
with increase do ding efficiency and improved reception 
over head and with performance almost like ideal 
performance of fountain code. 
With explosive increase in demand for 
additional frequency spectrum, cognitive radios (CRs) 
were offered to support existing and new services. CR 
scenarios were proposed to improve spectrum 
efficiency and to solve the normally occurring spectrum 
scarcity. CR is also highly agile wireless platform, so it is 
capable of autonomously choosing operating 
parameters based on both frequency spectrum and 
network conditions. CRs promise an enhanced 
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utilization of the limited spectral resources. In CR 
scenarios, secondary users (SUs) and primary users 
(PUs) coexist simultaneously [47], [48-51]. 
The detection of PUs can be accomplished by 
opportunistic spectrum sharing [50,52]. In opportunistic 
spectrum sharing, the PU usage is automatically 
monitored by SUs based on CR scenario. In the CR 
scenarios, no changes have to be made to legacy 
systems as the PU is unaware of the secondary usage 
of its spectrum. Since the arrival of a PU acts like an 
erasure on the SU link, it causes the SU to lose all the 
packets that are being transmitted over the channel 
which was under that particular PU’s carrier. In order to 
overcome this problem caused by PU arrival on the SU 
link, some techniques have been proposed in [53]. In 
fact, any method to employ some sort of feedback 
procedures is not practical over CR network, indeed, 
once the channel has been captured by a PU, the 
retransmission request has to be placed on a different 
channel, which may not be available or reliable. So in 
order to avoid the need for a feedback channel, erasure-
correcting codes are suggested [54]. Hence, the 
packets that are lost due to PU interference are now 
considered as erasures. The erasure-correcting codes 
used in our model are digital Fountain codes. 
The concept of digital Fountain codes was first 
introduced by Byers et al. [55,56] in 1998 for information 
distribution. Fountain codes are a class of erasure 
codes with the property that a potentially limitless 
sequence of encoding symbols can be generated from 
a given set of source symbols. The original source 
symbols can ideally be recovered by the decoder from 
any subset of the received coded symbols of size equal 
to or only slightly larger than the number of source 
symbols. The term fountain or rate less refers to the fact 
that these codes do not exhibit a fixed code rate. In [57] 
a solution to further enhance the performance of 
cognitive radio networks is proposed. 
LT complexity of the encoding and decoding is 
very low [54]. Some networks, such as cognitive radio 
networks, do not have a feedback channel. Applications 
on these networks still require reliability. The SU link of 
cognitive radio can be modeled as a two states channel. 
One state is influenced by channel fading and noise but 
the other is like erasure channel. Thus, erasure code is a 
good choice for cognitive radio [58]. On the other hand, 
in cognitive radio network, it is normal to assume that 
there are no network attackers and the participants 
involved in the protocols are honest. But attackers 
always try to corrupt data anyway. As a result, a secure 
code is essential that can save time and cost. 
As mentioned the successful deployment of CR 
networks and the realization of their benefits depend on 
the placement of essential security mechanisms in 
sufficiently robust form to resist misuse of the systems. 
Ensuring the trustworthiness of the spectrum sensing 
process is important in the CR networks, since spectrum 
sensing directly affects spectrum management and 
incumbent coexistence [59-63]. 
Hosseiniet al.,[83] presented a secondary link 
channel model and then secure LT code is proposed to 
supply security and reliability simultaneously. In the 
proposed block, a code matrix is used for generation of 
cryptographic key. Cryptographic key is not sent over 
the channel; as a result, the frequency spectrum is 
saved. Also coder information is used to generate 
cryptographic key. 
The importance of security in a cognitive radio 
network must highly be recognized. Since CR scenario 
permits attackers to easy and unauthorized access. First 
of all, secondary link channel model is proposed and a 
combinational block is proposed for a secure LT code, 
as well as providing security and error correction 
capability simultaneously. In SLC, a generator matrix is 
used to generate a random cryptographic key. SLC 
supply security without transmitting the key in a 
symmetric cryptography in a secure channel, as a result, 
the increase in spectrum efficiency becomes apparent. 
This implies saving time and costs. Besides, the key 
does not appear on channel, consequently, the 
attackers have to consider all possible key 
combinations. This block is useful in all communication 
systems that have no feedback channel. 
d) Trusted Collaborative Spectrum Sensing 
In cognitive radio networks (CRNs), spectrum 
sensing must meet the strict “ability to detect” 
requirements set by the FCC to protect primary users’ 
communications from excessive interference caused by 
secondary CR devices. To meet these requirements, 
cooperative sensing [58] and sensing Permission to 
make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for 
personal or classroom use is granted without fee 
provided that copies are not made or distributed for 
profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear 
this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy 
otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to 
redistribute to lists, requires prior specific scheduling 
[64,67] have been studied as efficient means to improve 
the sensing performance by exploiting spatio-temporal 
diversity in received signal strengths (RSSs). In [67], we 
proposed a sensing framework that minimizes the 
sensing-time while meeting the detection requirements 
by jointly optimizing sensor selection and sensing 
scheduling. An interesting observation made there is 
that when sensors are stationary as in 802.22 WRANs, 
the measured RSSs at each sensor are pseudo time-
invariant, depending on their geographic allocation, thus 
limiting the performance gain from sensing scheduling. 
Mobility is one of the most important factors in wireless 
systems because it affects numerous network 
characteristics, such as network capacity , connectivity, 
coverage [65], routing [66], etc. It is also an inherent 
feature to support various types of wireless services in 
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CRNs. While the 802.22 Working Group considered only 
stationary sensors (i.e., CPEs) in the initial standard 
draft, recently, they adopted an amendment for the 
operation of portable devices. Despite its importance, 
however, mobility is still largely unexplored in the context 
of dynamic spectrum access. Allowing sensor mobility 
in CRNs will introduce numerous challenges, making it 
necessary to revisit current system design and 
protocols, such as mechanisms for spectrum sensing, 
interference management and routing. As a first step to 
understand the impact of mobility in CRNs, we study the 
performance of spectrum sensing with mobile sensors 
via a theoretical study. In particular, we show that, when 
sensing is scheduled multiple times, sensor mobility can 
yield a significant performance gain by exploiting spatio-
temporal diversity in received primary signal strengths. 
This is in sharp contrast to the case of stationary 
sensors where the benefit to be gained from scheduling 
sensing is marginal. Our theoretical analysis indicates 
that the contribution of sensing scheduling to the 
performance improvement increases as the speed of 
mobile sensor increases, which raises an interesting 
question: how to establish a balance between the 
number of sensors to use and the number of times to 
sense? To address this question, we derive an optimal 
combination of these two design parameters that 
minimizes the overall sensing overhead. To our best 
knowledge, this is the first study to examine the impact 
of sensor mobility on the performance of spectrum 
sensing. 
The performance gains, achieved by 
collaborative spectrum sensing in CRNs are well 
established in literature. The centralized collaborative 
spectrum sensing has been included in the IEEE 802.22 
standard draft [1]. The secondary users report sensing 
results to a base station (fusion center) on a periodic or 
on-demand basis about the presence and absence of 
primary user using spectrum sensing. The secondary 
user trust is critical for such a cooperative systems to 
operate reliably. Trust-based mechanisms have been 
widely suggested for collaborative spectrum sensing 
under report falsifying attacks, where dishonest 
attackers lie on their sensing results. 
The calculation of the trust of secondary users 
has been addressed using different techniques in the 
literature. The trust values can be calculated from the 
reports received from the secondary users, comparing 
deviation suffered by each from average [4]. The 
secondary users are penalized according to the 
deviations calculated. In another paper by the same 
authors [8], outlier techniques are studied in detail and 
based on the knowledge of partial primary user activity, 
malicious user(s) identification is done. Among other 
techniques, the Bayesian rule can be applied to 
compute the a posteriori probability of being an attacker 
for each secondary user. When the posteriori probability 
of a certain secondary user exceeds the suspicious level 
threshold, it is claimed to be an attacker and is removed 
from the collaboration [6]. For multiple attackers, the 
large number of combinations of attackers and honest 
users is removed by using an onion-peeling based 
approximation to reduce computational complexity. 
Abnormality detection algorithm based on 
proximity, which is widely used in the field of data mining 
has been introduced in [3], to solve the problem of 
malicious users in the system using history reports of 
each secondary user. The proposed architecture in [7], 
needs to collect spectrum sensing data from multiple 
sources or equipment on consumer premises. This 
process is known as crowd sourcing. In [7], the area of 
interest is divided in to cells and the credibility of these 
devices are kept in check by corroboration among 
neighboring cells in a hierarchical structure to identify 
cells with significant number of malicious nodes. 
In the solution proposed by authors in [5], focus 
is on a small region for enhancing the primary user 
detection by exploring the spatial diversity in user 
reports. In another paper by the same authors, [2], 
impact of mobility in spectrum sensing is analyzed. The 
authors show that because of mobility, the secondary 
user sensing results get uncorrelated faster thus giving 
better performance compared to spectrum sensing 
performed by static secondary users. 
To the best of our knowledge, none of the 
existing work studied the impact of mobility on the 
malicious user detection and primary user detection 
under attack in CRNs. None of the existing trust-based 
collaborative spectrum sensing solutions are directly 
applicable for mobile scenarios, either. Our proposed 
solutions [13] are different from all the existing solutions 
that we separate the location reliability from the user 
trust, thus achieve better performance on malicious user 
detection which in turn improve the primary user 
detection under attacks in mobile scenarios. 
Collaborative spectrum sensing is a key 
technology in cognitive radio networks (CRNs). Although 
mobility is an inherent property of wireless networks, 
there has been no prior work studying the performance 
of collaborative spectrum sensing under attacks in 
mobile CRNs. Existing solutions based on user trust for 
secure collaborative spectrum sensing cannot be 
applied to mobile scenarios, since they do not consider 
the location diversity of the network, thus over penalize 
honest users who are at bad locations with severe path-
loss. In this paper, we propose to use two trust 
parameters, location reliability and malicious intention 
(LRMI), to improve both malicious user detection and 
primary user detection in mobile CRNs under attack. 
Location reliability reflects path-loss characteristics of 
the wireless channel and malicious intention captures 
the true intention of secondary users, respectively. We 
propose a primary user detection method based on 
location reliability (LR) and a malicious user detection 
method based on LR and Dempster-Shafer (D-S) theory. 
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Simulations show that mobility helps train location 
reliability and detect malicious users based on our 
methods. Our proposed detection mechanisms based 
on LRMI significantly outperforms existing solutions. In 
comparison to the existing solutions, we show an 
improvement of malicious user detection rate by 3 times 
and primary user detection rate by 20% at false alarm 
rate of 5%, respectively. 
Shraboni Jana et al [84] studied the 
performance of spectrum sensing under different path-
loss and fading conditions and came up with a solution 
fitting for mobile CRNs. The numerically simulated 
results showed that our approach (LRMI) greatly 
improves malicious detection in mobile CRNs and 
hence, performance of collaborative-spectrum sensing 
for primary user detection. Thus mobile CRNs, need to 
be evaluated considering both the location from where 
the report was generated and who has generated the 
report. Mobility is also found to be an aiding factor in 
malicious users detection. The simulation results also 
show that as the average velocity of the secondary 
users in the system increases, the ROC curves for the 
system improves. 
An interesting extension of the work will be to 
evaluate how malicious users can exploit mobility to 
their advantage and avoid getting detected. The primary 
user is static in our current model. 
e)
 
Spectrum Sensing Technique for Cognitive Radio 
Networks Under Denial of Service Attack
 
Jamming in wireless networks has been 
extensively studied. Most prior research assumes that 
the jammer is an external entity, oblivious to the protocol 
specifics and cryptographic secrets [25].Recently, 
several works have considered the problem of jamming 
by an internal adversary, who exploits knowledge of 
network protocols and secrets to launch DoS attacks on 
layers above the physical layer [13], [4], [7], [68], [6]. In 
this section, we classify related work based on the 
adversarial model.
 
Opportunistic spectrum access in CRNs makes 
them an easy target for attackers that may jeopardize its 
operation for their individual gains or merely because of 
malicious intent. Therefore, security of DSA in CRNs has 
been the focus of attention for many research efforts 
lately. This section provides an overview of related work 
and provides an insight as to how these studies differ 
from the work presented in this paper.
 
Measures to prevent the jamming of Common 
Control Channel (CCC) in an ad hoc CRN are presented 
in [69]. It
 
assumes that the jammers are aware of the 
protocol specifics as well as cryptographic quantities 
used to secure network operations. The authors 
propose two techniques to identify malicious nodes that 
act independently and those that collude to jam the 
CCC. They also propose generation and secure 
elude jammers. This however is primarily aimed at 
defending against jamming the CCC through which 
spectrum sensing and other control data are shared. On 
the other hand, our work addresses defense against 
jamming of spectrum sensing itself.
 
In [1], authors consider an ad hoc CRN in which 
they introduce various types of jammers: jammers that 
jam a fixed channel, a random selection of channels and 
channels that are predicted to be used next in 
subsequent time slots. An algorithm is proposed with 
which senders and receivers learn the jammers’ channel 
access pattern and can evade jamming by hopping to 
jamming-free channels. Our proposed DS3 algorithm 
does not resort to channel hopping and evades 
jamming while staying on the same channel.
 
A collaborative defense technique is presented 
in [2] where the SUs in a CRN defend against a 
collaborative DoS attack launched by sweeping and 
jamming the channels in the entire spectrum. The SUs 
make use of spatial and temporal diversity to form 
proxies in order to continue communicating. This work 
however does not consider that the jammer may seek to 
conserve its jamming power budget and jam only the 
fast sensing stage and the main defense against 
jamming attack is for the CRN to hop to another 
channel. Authors in [13] present a game theoretic 
approach to defend against jamming attacks in CRNS. 
They derive an optimal strategy for the SUs to decide 
whether to remain in the current band or to hop to 
another band by employing a Markov Decision Process 
approach. The authors propose a learning process 
through which SUs estimate current network conditions 
based on past observations using the maximum 
likelihood estimation technique. This work also
 
does not 
consider the two-stage spectrum sensing that is 
employed in the current IEEE 802.22 WRAN draft 
standard, and the defense against jamming is for CRN 
to hop to another channel.
 
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first 
attempt to address a smart jamming attack by malicious 
users and to make maximum utilization of spectrum 
opportunities while staying in the spectrum band that is 
being jammed and not hopping away from it.
 
Cliff C. Zou et al [85] proposed a novel 
algorithm DS3, which minimizes the effects of smart 
jamming as well as noise on the fast sensing phase of 
DSA and improves spectrum utilization through dynamic 
fine sensing decision algorithm with minimal increase in 
the overhead caused due to additional delay in the 
detection of PU’s presence on the spectrum. DS3 
achieves up to 90% improvement in spectrum utilization 
under jamming attack while keeping the PU detection 
delay to less than 50% of the maximum allowed PU 
detection delay.
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dissemination of hopping sequences for the CRN to 
The collaborative or cooperative spectrum 
sensing paradigm in CRN opens a way to the attackers 
who can falsify the sensing results. The motivation of an 
attacker can be either selfish or malicious. Being selfish, 
an attacker may report the presence of the primary user 
when there is actually none in order to deny the 
legitimate users’ access to the spectrum (Denial of 
Service attack). While being malicious, an attacker may 
report an absence of the primary user when there is one, 
thus causing chaos and interference for primary and 
secondary users.
 
Here in this paper we explored the 
contemporary affirmation of the recent literature on 
secure spectrum sensing, which indicates the 
opportunity for significant research to devise novel 
cooperation and collaboration strategies for CRNs, 
which are in regard to blocking the vulnerabilities that let 
the falsification of the cooperation and collaboration.
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